Smith said, "The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any resemblance."
And at last, the difference between "Student" and Fisher was scarcely acknowledged by the talented Fisher. 18 At the centenary mark of "Student's" path-breaking article, a first-hand study of "Student," his circumstances, and his actual approach to t might be instructive.
19 "It will be seen then that the difference between Prof. Fisher and myself," "Student" prophesied, "is not a matter of mathematics-heaven forbid-but of opinion" (Student 1938, p. 367 ).
"Student"-A Porter Brewer's Tale "Student" is the pseudonym used in 19 of 21 published articles by William Sealy Gosset, who was by pre-and real-occupation a chemist, brewer, inventor, and self-trained statistician, agronomer, and designer of experiments (Student 1942) .
Gosset was born in 1876 in Canterbury, England. Gosset and Vidal are recognized families of Kent and Devon, old of French Huguenot descent. The eldest of five children born to Colonel Frederic Gosset, R.E. (Royal Engineer), and Mrs. Agnes Sealy (Vidal) Gosset, William was cradled in the gentry and educated at Winchester School and Oxford University. 20 By all accounts it was a happy and comfortable childhood and life. The great unknown of statistical science worked his entire adult life-1899 to 1937-as an experimental brewer. He had one employer, Arthur Guinness, Son & Company, Ltd., Dublin, St. James's Gate.
It sounds like fantasy. But Gosset-the statistical "Student" of "Student's" test of significance-was a master brewer. He was a businessman, too, and rose in fact to the top of the top of the brewing industry-Guinness, St. James's Gate-that global maximum, that fermentation kingdom, that looming dark brick factory of good jobs and great beers, perched high above the Dublin average-yet friend of rich and poor-where he was hailed by more than golden harps and smiling toucans.
Gosset was in 1899 a energetic-if slightly loony-23 year old gentleman scientist. 21 An obsessive observer, counter, cyclist, and cricket nut, the self-styled brewer had a sizzle for invention, experiment, and the great outdoors. "All who have known him agree," recorded a master of statistics, "that [Gosset] possessed more of the characteristics of the perfect statistician than any man of his time" (E.S. Pearson 1939, pp. 248-9) . 22 A friend from childhood remembered that Gosset stood stoutly in the heart, too, possessing, he said, "an immovable foundation of niceness."
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Twenty years before Fordism would really hit the gas, Guinness was going great guns giving its brewery a radical make-over, and the nice chemist was one of a few good men it brought in to help. 24 To wit, economies of scale had not been fully tapped. The look-touch-and-sniff approach of 18 th century craft brewers had satisfied a Guinness bottom line for 150 years. No longer. (The firm was established in 1759; it went public in 1886.) The extent of Guinness's market was in a sense already large-larger than Bass, their chief competitor, largest in Ireland, and largest in the world. By 1914 annual production at Gosset's brewery would surpass 2 million hogsheads or 4.35 billion pints. 25 But until the 1890s, the extent of the market was limited by the guildsmen's division of labor (Dennison and MacDonagh, p. 23, 38; O'Grada, .
The Guinness future was in "scientific brewing"-large-scale, industrially controlled brewing-wherein all factors of production, from barley breeding to taste testing, are controlled, improved, and confirmed by experimental science. 26 Danish and German breweries were transforming similarly-perhaps a little ahead of Guinness's imposing pace. 27 And worldwide, it's true, a scientific enthusiasm was in the general air, for industry and poor laws as much as for agriculture and beer laws.
28
But Guinness was unique in the industry in a number of ways, and especially-for the future development of statistics-by vesting its exclusively chosen brewers with economic authority. With scientific brewers in managerial position, the theory was, experiments could shine a light on the bottom line and the bottom line a light on the experiments. Gosset, 1907 Gosset, to 1937 , and one finds his jokes beside the point (Student 1942) .
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Regardless, the inventor of "Student's" t possessed a wickedly fertile imagination and more energy and focus than a St. Bernard in a snowstorm. He worked in relative obscurity. He won no prizes and held no academic posts; his bust ornaments no column or portico. But he went on to invent or inspire solution concepts that have evolved into six or seven different research fields in the modern disciplines of statistics, agronomy, brewing, and industrial quality control. 35 Gosset made significant scientific and commercial contributions, too, embodied in Guinness beer. Other contributions are less opaque and yet lamentably unknown.
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Strangely nowhere in our statistical education do we learn that "Student" was a major scientist and muse of 20 th century statistics who once lorded over the great Irish brewery. The correlation between "Student's" test and Guinness is positive and large. Log-logistically Gosset rose in rank to become both Head Brewer and Head Statistician. Pounding out up to 100 million gallons of Guinness annually, Gosset brought to perfection the quantitative side of scientific brewing and with it a storehouse of theory and tools. "Student's" test made the "Student" name world-famous but the test was nothing like Gosset's last or favorite word on the subject of uncertainty. The Economic Origins of "Student's" t Small samples came microeconomically to Gosset-an organic case of competition and choice arising from scarcity. His job was to show a profit in experimental porter without raising the price of the porter. That, in short, is how he discovered t.
Porter is a name given to a dark and bitter beer with a good head on it. The origin of its name is equally mysterious. The economic historian Oliver MacDonagh (1964, p. 530 ) traces porter to early 18 th century London. "Black" beers, MacDonagh finds, were revealed preferred by common street porters, and publicans and brewers seized an opportunity. In the 19 th century and early 20 th century the eponymous porter was alternatively called "stout" or "stout porter." Normally speaking the different names did not signify a real deviation of product.
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"Stout" is the name used now to describe a beer such as Guinness that is bitter on the up-take (bitterness being a function of both the quantity and quality of hops added per barrel of malt) and yet smooth, mellow, and slightly smoky on the finish. Black-ruby tint arises like the smoky finish from roasted barley or "malt"-the distinguishing ingredient. As Arthur Guinness himself stated before a Parliamentary Committee of 1783, "A porter brewer buys none but the best, as none else will answer." 43 But "best"-practice brewing was, scientifically speaking, anyone's guess. Until the 1890s, the industry ran on faith and folk theorems. William Sealy Gosset had to be invented.
Brewing "experimentally" introduced challenges and trade-offs. For example, in Gosset's time, Guinness stout was a completely natural and unpasteurized beer. No artificial ingredients or preservatives. But what is good for health or taste is bad for the life of the beer: in keg, cask, or bottle, the life of a natural beer is numbered in days. Yet Guinness's beer was shipped worldwide, on an increasingly large scale, a problem. Hops acts as a natural and effective preservative, true. But it is bitter, and brings bacteria, pests, and other costs to the beer. Other things equal, each pound of hops added to the mash tuns induced life and bitterness in some (as yet) unknown functional form. A heavily hopped beer, such as "Foreign Extra Stout," would continue to condition on the ocean voyage. By Port Royal, Jamaica, or Rio de Janeiro, a hopped beer may be safe but too bitter-not Irish.
44 A trade-off to be estimated.
Another challenge was that Guinness, a wholesale dealer only, pursued an unusual pricing strategy: constant nominal price (measured in Dublin prices). 45 Product price was fixed.
But between 1887 and 1914, output more than doubled. Plant size expanded, too, and with it the capital/output ratio. So the profit-searching question was: how can experimental science advance economies of scale in brewing? How can inferential statistics help to control and improve product, while at the same time reduce average total costs for the firm? Take hops, for example. The method of choosing the ancient yellowing bells based on looks or fragrance wasn't treated to a pauper's burial. But neither was it efficient or reliable on the large scale. When in 1898 results of Guinness's first hops experiments arrived the brewers were elated. "Until quite recently, no attempt has been made to analyse hops commercially," began a report, "Hops, Season 1897."
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The author of the report was Thomas B. Case, an older graduate of Winchester and Oxford. 47 Case and his team felt they had found a method "proving that those hops which contained the most soft resins gave the most stable beer"-the most shelf life. "The earliest Brewery experiments were directed towards getting the same results with the same sample of hops." So Case analyzed the average percentage of soft and hard resins found in samples of 50 grams (dry weight) taken from several seasons of American and Kent hops (Case 1898, p. 47 Case couldn't celebrate. "We could not . . . support the conclusion that there are no differences between pockets of the same lot."
The Table shows why. Case examined 11 samples of Kents, 1897, finding 8.1% soft resins; Mr. Briant examined 14 samples of the same lot, finding 8.4% soft resins-a difference of .3%. The mean difference between their two samples of "American, 1895" was even higher, at .7% (soft) and 1.0% (hard); and for some reason, Case consistently found less resins. Case worried about "defects" in his procedure, especially the "difficulty of sampling."
The main portion of the work concerned "brewing value." The goal, after all, was to employ soft resins content as a predictor of optimal hops for purchase and thus brewing value.
Case offered a "provisional" figure, suggesting that each "1 per cent of soft resins is worth 7s. 4d"-seven shillings, four pence-per hundredweight. Given the 1898 input of 42,108 hundredweight (4.72 million imperial pounds), knowing the true resin-to-shilling ratio was commercially important. Yet "the great difficulty" of sampling kept Case agnostic (p. 50).
It seems the real difficulty, however, was a lack of knowledge about inferential statistics, period. Lacking a theory of error, what difference could Case infer, and with what accuracy, beyond the unmeasured judgment of big, small, or "I can't say"?
Other experiments proceeded apace: on barley yield and quality ("variety trials"), on the chemistry of malt extract, on the temperature of kiln drying.
One of the great difficulties with all these experiments was the small size of samples, and for two economically related reasons. First, in field experiments, the number of acres available was limited by the opportunity costs of farmers and brewers and by the economic division of scientific labor. The scientists experimented on a two acre plot at St. James's Gate (Case 1908, p. 2) . 48 But commissioned farmers and maltsters themselves, such as Gosset's long-time collaborator, the eminent E.S. Beaven, allocated no more than four acres (Beaven 1947, p. 164; Gosset 1937 , Student 1938 The specter of probable error haunted all these tests of porter but in 1898 Case and his team did not know how. All this difficulty (save a dependence on small samples) changed rapidly in 1904 when Gosset circulated an internal report entitled "The Application of the 'Law of Error' to the Work of the Brewery" (Nov. 3, 1904) :
Results are only valuable when the amount by which they probably differ from the truth is so small [he said] as to be insignificant for the purposes of the experiment. What the odds should be depends-1. On the degree of accuracy which the nature of the experiment allows, and 2. On the importance of the issues at stake.
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Gosset's report was remarkable for a number of reasons. 51 Two features can be highlighted.
First, the self-trained statistician perceived an economic relationship between "importance" and odds ratios (what level of statistical significance a brewer will accept in any given case). Second-and fully four years before his 1908 article-Gosset underscored a positive correlation in the normal distribution curve between "the square root of the number of observations" and the level of statistical significance. Other things equal, he wrote, "the greater the number of observations of which means are taken, the smaller the [probable] error" (p. 5). "And the curve which represents their frequency of error," he illustrated, "becomes taller and narrower" (p. 7). Since its discovery in the early 19 th century, the normal probability curve had been tabled for comparatively large samples only. 52 Helmert's pioneering work sat for years unread by English statisticians, and seems anyway beside the point (Fisher 1939, p. 4 (Gosset 1904, p. 7) . He wasn't out on a statistical limb; he was out for profit. For example, he said, "it might be maintained" that malt extract "should be [estimated] within .5 of the true result with a probability of 10 to 1" (p. 7). Malt extract = ([Specific gravity of the wort] -1000) x 4.67, measured in degrees saccharine per barrel of 168 lbs. malt. 54 In the decade before the First World War, an extract in the neighborhood of 133º gave the targeted level of alcohol content. Controlling extract was important for maintaining it and the nominal price rigidity: the higher the extract (and thus alcohol content), the higher the excise tax; ± .5 was a difference or error in malt extract that Guinness and its customers could swallow so And he correctly concluded, "In order to get the accuracy we require [that is, 10 to 1 odds with .5 accuracy], we must, therefore, take the mean of [at least] four determinations" (n= 4; the odds at n=3 being insufficiently low).
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Circulated by Gosset when Fisher was a "practically blind" 14 year old school boy (Box, p. 14) , the report was instantly hailed by the Board. Gosset himself wasn't convinced. "We have been met with the difficulty," he cautioned, "that none of our books [on the theory of errors] mentions the odds, which are conveniently accepted as being sufficient to establish any conclusion." He said, "It might be of assistance to us to consult some mathematical physicist on the matter" (p. Setting the level of significance is not to be made "conventionally" or by "some outside authority in mathematics." What is considered "significant" or not, Gosset told Pearson, what is worth retaining for analysis and decision, depends on the opportunity cost of following a result as if true, added to the opportunity cost of conducting the experiment itself. The limit of significance, in other words, is not to be set at .05 or some other arbitrary convention; how the limit should be set in any given case is a matter of quality-adjusted net pecuniary gain. Gosset's revised and expanded table "t", which is the old "Student's" z reduced by (n-1), "degrees of freedom." 61 ) Still the son of a combat engineer could stand alone. Said his editor
Pearson in a letter, it made little difference whether the standard error was divided by n or the rigorously correct (n-1) "because only naughty brewers take n so small that the difference is not of the order of the probable error!" But the naughty brewer did not retreat from his opportunity cost approach to small samples. As a profit center, he couldn't. Gosset began to use regression analysis in the small sample context as early as 1904. In 1908 he used it to revisit the 1898 'hops input' versus 'life of beer' question. In a fantastic analytical leap beyond Case, Gosset-assisted only by slide rule, mechanical calculator, and a few good books-estimated parabolas of the form "L = A + BH 2 , where L = life [of beer] in days A = life in days of no-hopped beer depending on conditions H = lbs. of hops B = a constant [slope parameter] depending on the hops and on the conditions" (Gosset 1908, p. 145) .
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"No-hop brewings" (A) could survive between "12.2 and 16.7 days," he found after numerous repetitions of the experiment under same and different conditions, whereas "hopped" (B) could live for a month or beyond. Good so far as it goes. Yet here spills forth additional evidence of Gosset's persistently economic approach. Despite the analytical leap, he a few months later admitted the "advantage to replace a vague character like increase in life . . . . by a single definite value which can be directly converted into £ s. d."-pounds, shillings, and pence (Gosset 1909 Lab. R., p. 211). So Gosset did take advantage, as was his usual, and replaced the vague character. From partial correlations he calculated on the percentage of soft resins and " [brewing] value," he argued, "We can find an equation giving the probable value for any given percentage of soft resins. The equation is V = 2.82 + 10.78S, where V is the per cent Value compared with the 'standard' hop, and S is the soft resins measure from 9 per cent [n = 40]. It will be seen," he said in a language that was practically taboo to a mind like Pearson's, "that each one per cent. of soft resins makes a difference of 10.78 per cent. in the value of the hops. This," he said, "at the average [1909] price of hops, represents about 8s. per [hundredweight] ." At a 1909 input of 6.79 million pounds of hops, Gosset discovered a big economic difference (Case's guess, being close to it, was better than a large sample regression bias would predict).
"The probable error of the prediction is large," Gosset however cautioned, "being about 6.6 per cent" (compare Pearson's 1% rule and Fisher's 5% rule). But the noisy resins variable did not stop Gosset from making a judgment about resins' economic importance to brewing value. "Of this [probable error] some 3.2 per cent. is due to errors of analysis and sampling," he said, "leaving [a residual experimental error] due to brewing errors and other factors not included in the analysis" (p. 212). But with the new if still highly imperfect and noisy method of making inferences from small samples-Gosset called his method "life regressions"-Gosset was able to reject about one-third of the 'standard' hops that unscientific methods had previously commended (pp. 212-13). One third. Again the Board cheered.
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What Gosset did later for the bottom line in barley is hopped up by several orders of magnitude . His "extract" regressions and variety trials helped to establish, for example, the quantitative and chemical relationships between ready formed sugars and malt quality and between nitrogenous material in barley and brewing value. To repeat, three barleys he selected and proved in experiments with E. S. Beaven were by 1947 grown on "well over five million acres." Precision matters, as for example in soft resins and malt extract. But a low probable error-high statistical significance-ranked low in "Student's" ordering. His had no rules. "Student" did not close the brewery on grounds that a result reached or failed to reach an arbitrary level of statistical significance. 64 Minimizing real error -the loss function-was the porter-brewer's rule and test. Samples heap up aplenty. Two more shall suffice. On May 18, 1929, Gosset wrote a letter to a very different adopted student and friend, Egon S. Pearson, repeating to the son what had been lost upon the father: 65 I fancy you give me credit for being a more systematic cove than I really am in the matter of limits of significance. What would actually happen would be that I should make out P t (normal) and say to myself "that would be about 50:1; pretty good but as it may not be normal we'd best not be too certain" . . . and whether one would be content with that or would require further work would depend on the importance of the conclusion and the difficulty of obtaining suitable experience.
Gosset to E. S. Pearson, reprinted in Pearson 1939, p. 244 in general do this they will make money by it", but also "we have found it so in nineteen cases out of twenty and we are finding out why it doesn't work in the twentieth." To do that you have to be as sure as possible which is the 20th-your real error must be small
Gosset to E. S. Pearson 1937 , in Pearson 1939 . Emphasis in original.
Statistical "significance"-high t values-meant that little to "Student." In fact, few realize that Neyman-Pearson "power"-which to Fisher's consternation estimates a significance-level-adjusted trade-off with Type II error as the experimental result deviates from the null-can also be traced to "Student." 66 "Student" intuited the idea of power in two letters of May, 1926 to Egon Pearson (Pearson 1966: 4-11) 67 Despite that analytical leap, the power function, too, was to "Student" just one of dozens of checks to put on the size or opportunity cost of "real error." Statistical significance was in any case "nearly valueless" in itself.
Fisher's 5% Rule
Not so with Fisher. If Karl Pearson was resistant to "Student's" cost considerations, Ronald Fisher was ideologically opposed to them. Sir Ronald's is a non-economic and even-by the 1950s-a disturbingly anti-economic approach. Though claiming to teach "Student's" small sample method, Fisher rejected "Student's" natural ingredients, added some unnatural ones, and re-presented Guinnessometrics in a foreign, philosophical tongue. Out of his mash popped a rote method and ton of science. Said Fisher in successive years, 1925 to 1955 The value for which P=. (Student 1931a) . He focused on estimation, prior probability, alternative hypotheses, questions of "how much" (e.g., Student 1926 Student [1942 , p. 126 ). As a Bayesian it was natural for him to see the illogic of Fisher's procedure: the probability of the hypothesis, given the data, is not the same as the probability of the data, given the hypothesis. Yet in Fisher's procedure the prior probability is neglected and the identity forced: contrast Jeffreys's discussion of his own Gosset-inspired "porter" test, the posterior odds ratio test of economic relevance: 1961, pp. 378-9; see also Leamer 1978, and McCloskey 2007, Reasons for the widespread acceptance of Fisher's 5 percent philosophy are too complex to disentangle in a brief article. (See Ziliak and McCloskey 2007, chps. 20-23.) 68 The fact of acceptance in economics and other areas is obvious.
Conclusion
The difference between "Student" and Fisher seemed to "Student" to be one of opinion. The facts support the view that the difference between them was real and big and canonical. But as Adam Smith long ago suggested, the difference probably did not arise naturally but rather as the product of habit, custom, and education. The mathematical geneticist did not habitually respond to the call of profit but rather to a brand of rule-based philosophy. As Bruno de Finetti once observed in a symposium about the esteemed Fisher corpus, "The economic approach seems (if not rejected owing to aristocratic or puritanic taboos) the only device apt to distinguish neatly what is or is not contradictory in the logic of uncertainty" (de Finetti 1971, pp. 486-7) . Here we seem to have a case in point. It is not obvious what to do with this difference; it depends on one's prior. For example, it is important to remember that not every student you meet, beginning with Ronald Fisher himself, deigns to pass the "porter" test. But if you hand him a test of significance and a pint of Guinness, and ask him to explain the logic and history of each, he will, if he is careful not to stumble, come upon William Sealy Gosset and the economic foundation of "Student's" t. 
